Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the Financial System in East Asia: Evidence from Thailand and Malaysia by Mieno, Fumiharu
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the Financial








Right   
Center for Economic Institutions 



















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 





“ Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the 
Financial System in East Asia: Evidence from 
Thailand and Malaysia” 
Fumiharu Mieno 
























Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the Financial System 





Existing studies on the financial system in East Asia have emphasized its excessive 
debt financing, the lack of a bond market and its limited function on corporate 
governance. Other apparent facts, such as the average low debt ratio, the existence 
of large but unlisted firms, and the significance of foreign firms in its economy are 
generally ignored. Based on a uniquely compiled database for the top 1000 firms in 
Thailand and Malaysia, we examined the distributional feature of listed status and 
foreign ownership, and then re-estimated the determinants of the capital structures. 
We confirmed basic facts, such as the fact that unlisted firms occupy a large portion 
in the distribution, and that the debt financing of major firms is relatively inactive. 
We also found the significance of foreign ownership and its negative relationship 
with debt financing and ‘going public’. Finally, we found that certain kinds of 
foreign firms tend to keep large retained earnings and non-bank debt, suggesting 
their deep reliance on self-financing and internal capital markets. The characteristics 
of corporate finance in East Asia can be explained in part by distributional features 
on listing status and foreign ownership. Our findings raised questions about the 
conventional view of the current policy framework which emphasized on the shift 
from financial intermediation to the capital and bond markets. 
Keywords: Financial System, Corporate Finance, East Asia, FDI 
JEL Categories: G30, G32, O52 
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Conventional policy arguments on the financial system in East Asia have emphasized the 
issues of excessive debt financing, the lack of a bond market and the problems with weak 
corporate governance.  On the other hand, some apparent facts which are contradictory to such 
a view but crucial for the argument have generally been ignored. For example, the debt ratio of 
major firms is comparably low on average in East Asia, and many of the large but unlisted firms 
play a significant role in the economy.  Also, the size of the numerous foreign firms in a form 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) varies widely, from large multinational companies (MNCs) to 
very small enterprises. 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the conventional understanding of corporate finance 
in East Asia, expanding the sample focus from the major listed firms referred in most studies to 
wider varieties including unlisted firms and foreign subsidiaries. The country focus is Thailand 
and Malaysia. 
Based on the financial statement of the listed firms in 9 countries, Claessens et al. pointed 
the high debt ratio of the firms and their increasing trends during the early 1990s, the period 
preceding the Asian financial crisis in one of their representative studies on the corporate 
finance and governance in the East Asia (Claessens et al. 1999,2000).  They also asserted that 
the weak corporate governance caused the major inefficiency problems under the 
pyramid-shaped ownership structure. Meanwhile, Booth et al. (2001) examined the 
determinants of capital structure based on the financial data of the listed firms in developing 
countries including East Asia, and pointed out that the equity dependent features, instead of debt, 
are found in developing countries. 
Many studies have focused on the corporate finance in the individual countries in East 
Asia: e.g. Mieno (2006) on Thailand, Okuda and Saito (2007) on the Philippines, Suto (2003) 
on Malaysia, and Lee et al. on Korea (2000).  All examine the determinants of the capital 
structures.  Although the results of the estimations vary across the countries and the 
approaches, the debt ratios observed in all the studies are generally lower than those of 
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Classens’s studies
1, and shows only very partial relationships among debt ratio, ownership and 
weakness of governance. 
One possible research breakthrough on this issue may be achieved by examining on how 
the financial system does or does not play an intermediation role to the sectors which have led 
economic and industrial growth in East Asia, rather than by merely criticizing the 
underdeveloped financial and corporate system, or of excessively emphasizing the significance 
of capital inflow in the macroeconomic point of view.  Looking back on the last decade, the 
transformation in the real sectors accompanied in the recovery process from the Asian crisis, 
independently from the prolonged distress in the financial sector.  The fact suggests that the 
current financial sectors in East Asia may not play a major role in providing funds to leading 
industrial sectors, although it appears so and that industrial sectors behave more independently 
in their fund raising. 
In fact, the largest impediment for accurate examination on the reality of the financial 
intermediation from the microeconomic stand point in East Asia is the simple fact that the basic 
information on the major firms currently existing and operating is not easily available.  This is 
in part because many firms still stay unlisted and do not participate in the organized capital 
market(securities exchange), and in part because economic growth has largely depended on FDI, 
and requires numerous foreign firms to operate, most of which are not easily observable in 
researches.  Actually, the corporate finance focusing only on listed firms has been studied and 
discussed in the situation that no one knows how the major firms are distributed in the East 
Asian countries, and no one knows where the listed firms are actually located in these 
distributions. 
Recognizing such shortcoming, the research question here is set in rather simple form; 
does the financial sector really play a sufficient role of intermediation to the corporate sector, 
and how much significant is it?  The question can be expressed in different words; does the 
corporate sector really depend on the financial sector for their fund raising, and how much 
1  The ratios seem consistent only in Korea. 
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crucial is it?  In order to find the answer to this, we will start with a very basic work of 
constructing a higher-coverage firm database and of draw the picture of the distribution of firms 
in the economies.  To acquire the better-covered sample data, the firm information was 
collected not from the disclosed data of listed firms at the stock exchanges, but from the stored 
microfiches in the company registration offices of the each government
2. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we explain how we use our 
data.  The characteristics of the firm distributions are examined in Section 3, and the general 
tendency of the capital structures is observed in Section 4.  In Sections 5 and 6, we estimate 
the determinants of the capital structure, namely debt ratio, bank borrowing ratio and non-bank 
debt, with focus on foreign ownership structure and listed status.  Section 7 gives some 
discussions and concludes the paper. 
2. Data 
We selected the data sample for the corporate profiles and financial statements using the 
following process (Table1). First, based on the total asset size in 2004, we listed the top 1,000 
unlisted firms in the non-financial sector, and collected their corporate profiles. Adding the same 
information of all the listed firms in the non-financial sector available at the stock exchanges, 
we completed a “firm profile database” of 1,301 firms for Thailand and 1,860 firms for 
Malaysia.  Setting the minimum size criteria at the smallest total asset size of the unlisted firms 
(e.g. 1,040 Million Bahts in Thailand), we got rid of listed firms that were smaller than the 
minimum criteria ,from the samples and finally arrived at sums of 1,189 and 1,860 samples 
respectively (Table 1). 
Second, we collected shareholder information for all the available firms.  Information for 
the top ten shareholders in Thailand, and the top five in Malaysia, were available in our data 
2  The registration office operates under the ministry of commerce in Thailand, and under local (state) 
governments in Malaysia.  All the firms are obligated to submit their company profiles and simplified 







     








   
 
                                                  
   
source. 
Third, we collected and compiled the financial statements (i.e. the balance sheet and 
income statement) of the unlisted firms, for the top 300 firms in Thailand and the top 250 in 
Malaysia in the period of 2000-04
3.  Adding the financial statements of listed firms in the same 
ranges of the total asset size, we completed a “financial statement database” in panel data form 
for top 447 firms and 846 firms respectively. 
The main sources of the data for the unlisted firms were registration documents stored in 
the registration offices in microfiche form.  We entrusted consultant companies in each country 
to collect and compile the primal data of the unlisted firms.  The data for the listed firms are 
from a commercial database, OSIRIS by Bureau van Dijk Ltd. 
3. Distribution of listed status and foreign ownership 
3.1. General Characteristics 
Table 1 summarized the sample structure classified by the asset size and the listed status. 
Apparently, the unlisted firms weigh significantly in total samples for both countries. The 
number of listed firms is counted to only 33.3% in the top 447 and 22.5% in the top 1,189 in 
Thailand, and 74.8% in the top 846, and 48.6% in the top 1,824 in Malaysia. The table also 
shows that the listed firm sample includes very small-sized  ones.  Particularly  in  Thailand,  the 
listed firms are tail-long distributed, and as much as 29.5% (112 / 380) of the firms are so small 
that they do not satisfy our observation criteria. 
3.2. Foreign Ownership 
In order to investigate the foreign ownership structure, we classified the foreign share 
based on the top 10 (Thailand), or top 5 (Malaysia) shareholders’ information. We defined the 
percentage of foreign shares as the total sum of shares in the top 5 or 10 shareholders.  We 
employed the following typology of foreign ownership. 
3  The sample sizes of the available data are a little smaller due to the lack of the data quality. 
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A. 0-10%: Financial Investment 
B. 10-95%: Joint Venture – participation in managerial control
 
B-a: 10-50%: controlled mainly by local counterparts 

B-b: 50-95%: controlled mainly by foreign capital 

C. 95% or more: Foreign Subsidiary – completely controlled by foreign capital 
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the ownership combined with listed status. 
Each bar shows the composition of 100 firms, ordered by total size from left to right.  The 
graphs include more detailed classification than the typology above, 33.3% and 66.7% for 
reference. 
Thailand 
For Thailand, Figure 1 confirms that the weight of the listed firms is relatively low; they are 
counted in around 50% of the top 100 firms, and less than 30% of the smaller layers.  The 
figure also indicates several remarkable facts.  First, many firms accept foreign capital in fact. 
For example, the foreign shares are found in as much as 52.3% of firms (62.1% in the listed, 
and 54.5% in the unlisted) among the top 400 in various forms, and 31.8% of firms (14.7% and 
40.5% respectively) accept more than 10% of the foreign shares. 
Second, the main form can be classified into two types; 
- Type (1) financial investment (A), less than 10% share, to the listed firms; 
- Type (2) joint venture (B-a and B-b), or local subsidiary (C) to the unlisted firms. 
The case of more than 10% share is rarely found in the listed firms, while conversely, 
investment share in the unlisted firms is over 10% in most cases, suggesting that FDI-related 
firms generally remain as unlisted firms. 
Third, the type (1) investment is prevalent and significant in the top 400 layer, 
outreaching to 47.4% of all the listed firms.  Thai securities market recovered and portfolio 
















   
   
 
inflow of foreign portfolio investment is largely biased to the layer of large listed firms, hence, 
the expanding foreign portfolio investment have had a limited role for firms’ fundraising 
situation as whole. 
Fourth, the wide prevalence and significance of type (2) investment is a little surprising. 
About 18% of the unlisted firms are owned by foreign capital as local subsidiaries, C, and 
27-30% of all the unlisted firms are under their control by over 50% (C, and B-a).  Type (2) 
firms are not concentrated in the large firm layer, but are distributed more broadly to the smaller 
firm layer. 
Malaysia 
In contrast to the case of Thailand, a substantial portion of the large firms in Malaysia 
participate in the securities market as listed firms. The listed firms occupy around 97% in the 
top 100, and 74% in the top 600. This fact confirms a common view that Malaysia retains the 
most developed securities market in Southeast Asia.  Figure 2 also shows that Malaysia holds a 
substantial amount of genuine local firms compared with Thailand, and foreign firms are less 
significant both in the listed and the unlisted groups. 
We found three striking characteristics in the distribution of Malaysian firms.  First, the 
financial investment in the listed firm by less than 10% (Type (1)), is rare in Malaysia.  Among 
the listed firms in the top 600, only 4% are classified into this type.  On the other hand, in the 
large firm level, such as the top 200, firms with substantially high foreign shares are common, 
some of which hold more than 50% of the foreign share.  Secondly, while the unlisted firms 
are rarely found in the top 200
th layer, they occupy a substantial portion in the 200-1000
th layers, 
with a larger portion in the smaller layer.  Foreign ownership is distributed prevalently in 
Malaysia, just as it is in Thailand. 
Third, and most strikingly for Malaysia, local subsidiaries of foreign firms counted for a 
very large portion among Type (2) foreign investment, suggesting that FDI in Malaysia is 
implemented in the form of establishing subsidiaries more frequently than joint ventures.  This 
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is a remarkable difference from Thailand, and seems consistent with the FDI ‘enclave’ feature of 
the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
Both two cases imply the limited role of portfolio investment for firms’ fund raising. 
Although in Thailand portfolio investment at the organized capital markets is popular to a 
degree, the stock acquisition by foreign capital is mainly realized outside of organized markets 
(i.e. authorized securities exchanges).  In Malaysia, foreign portfolio investment through the 
market is generally rare, and the joint venture relationship of foreign and local capital is 
seemingly weak. 
(3) The nationalities of foreign capital 
The nationalities of the sample firms show each country’s characteristics.  Table 2 
summarizes the nationality of the largest shareholders of the sample firms
4.  While  the  number 
of the genuine domestic firms counted a little larger for Malaysia (77.4% in total) than for 
Thailand (63.7%), in both cases foreign capitals occupy substantial weight as the largest 
shareholders.  Among foreign capitals, Japanese are the largest in number in both countries, 
followed by the U.S., Singaporean and EU’s.  Japanese capital is overwhelming in Thailand 
(18.8%), but is just comparable with Singaporean and EU’s in Malaysia (6.4%).  The presence 
of the U.S. firms is larger in Thailand than in Malaysia, are EU firms are observed only in 
Malaysia.  Taiwanese and Korean seem to remain as a minority foreign capital. 
4. Capital Structure 
Thailand 
Table 3 summarizes the capital structure of the top 447 Thai firms in the year averages 
classified by their listed status.  Since samples are selected in a common criteria based on total 
assets, the figures in the table are controlled for the total assets
5. The available sample size 
4  Calculated only with the firms available for nationality. The nationality of the largest shareholder 
cannot be identified in ** of 1,189 firms in Thailand and ** of 1848 in Malaysia. 
5  The available sample size varies across years. Also, we omitted the firms where the data are not 
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varies by years. Also, we omitted the firms where the data are not available for at least the past 
three years. 
The table gives us important information.  First, the debt ratios are levels of 50%, which 
falls into a substantially low category in international comparison
6  contrary to the assertion of 
Claessens (1998, 2000).  The ratios are slightly higher in the listed firms.  The debt ratio 
generally tends to decline in the early 2000s, suggesting that the firms have weakened their 
dependence on financial intermediation for their fund raising during the period of the financial 
turmoil and restructuring. 
Second, in the capital account side, the listed firms hold greater capital surplus than the 
unlisted ones. This is seemingly caused from the retained surplus gained at the initial public 
offering (Mieno and Gunji (2004)). Conversely, the retained earnings are greater in the unlisted 
firm particularly in 2000-01, suggesting the listed firms which depend more on external finance 
were damaged more seriously from the 1997’s financial crisis. 
Third, the composition of bank borrowings show the trend similar to the debt ratio, which 
is higher in listed firms than unlisted firms, the gap is much higher; 22.7% in the listed, 17.9% 
in the unlisted.  Corresponding to this, the non-bank debts are higher in the unlisted firms. The 
listed firms are more dependent on financial intermediation than the unlisted firms, in spite of 
the fact that they are more accessible to the capital markets.  The unlisted firms tend to depend 
on internal capital market or informal markets. This is evidence of complementarity, rather than 
substitutionality, between financial intermediation and the capital markets. 
The bank borrowing ratio also declines in the early 2000s, while the non-bank debt is 
constant in the listed firms, and declines in the unlisted firms, implying that the former coped 
with the retrogression of financial intermediation by strengthening the preference to the internal 
market, while the latter coped by self-financing. 
available at least three years. 

6  According to Booth et al.(2001), the debt ratios of major firms in developed countries are roughly 

classified into two categories: Middle of 50% level in Anglo-Saxon type (The U.A., the U.K. etc.) and 

around 70% in Continental Europe type (France, Germany, Japan, etc.) 
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In sum, Thai firms are not seriously dependent on debt financing, and the levels of the 
bank borrowing and the long-term debt are low. Their dependence on intermediation is 
relatively weak. Comparably, the listed firms more actively utilize financial intermediation in 
their fundraising.  And the dependence on the financial intermediation is shrinking recently in 
both the listed and the unlisted firms. 
Malaysia 
Table 4 shows the Malaysian case with the same treatment of the sample selection as 
Thailand. The tendency is similar to Thailand in some points, and different in others. 
First, the debt ratios show the middle of 40% level in the listed firms, and less than 40% 
in the unlisted. The levels are indeed low, much lower than in Thailand, and are incomparable to 
the case of developed countries.  The gap of debt ratios between the listed and the unlisted is 
around 5%, which is higher than in Thailand.  On the other hand, the ratio keeps constant 
through the observation periods, and the sign of the decline is not found.  The facts suggest 
that the function of the financial intermediation was not seriously damaged by the crisis in 
Malaysia, while the degree of the dependence on financial intermediation is generally low. 
Second, in the capital account side, capital surpluses are almost the same in the listed and 
unlisted firms, whereas retained earnings are higher in the unlisted firms, suggesting that 
financial crisis primarily hit the listed firms. 
Third, the bank borrowing ratio, one of the components of debt ratio, is surprisingly low 
in Malaysia: 10-13% in the listed firms, and only 4-6% in the unlisted firms.  These striking 
figures indicate that, in Malaysia, the bank borrowing or financial intermediation hardly plays a 
role for firms’ fundraising, and a large portion of the firms’ debt consists of non-bank debt. In 
other words, they largely rely on internal capital markets.  The important fact is that non-bank 
debt ratios in the listed and the unlisted firms are almost the same, and the gap in debt ratios is 
generated by the gap in bank borrowing.  The bank borrowing and the non-bank debt are not 
10  
   
   










                                                  
       
substitutive in Malaysia, and the listed firms utilize bank borrowing jointly with non-bank debt
7. 
Summarizing the observation in comparison with Thailand, the debt ratios of major firms 
in both countries are not necessarily high, but rather low.  In particular, bank borrowing ratios 
are so low in Malaysia that we can see that the financial intermediation hardly plays a 
significant role in the firms’ fundraising.  The internal market is significant in both countries, 
whereas bonds have not yet become a major funding source for firms.  The listed firms are 
more dependent on intermediation than the unlisted, which is a common tendency in both 
countries. 
Regarding the difference between the two countries, Malaysian firms show remarkably 
low dependence on the financial intermediation. However, it has gradually strengthened in the 
early 2000s, while it has weakened in Thai firms. 
5. Estimation Methodology 
Based on the descriptive observation below, the following two sections will estimate 
determinants of capital structure, searching for the relationship among fundraising, the listed 
status and foreign ownership.  In these sections, we will estimate the determinants of debt ratio, 
bank borrowing ratio and the non-bank debt ratio, based on the agency cost approach, and 
interpret the results with the evidence also from the descriptive statistics. 
There are several well known basic factors to primarily influence the capital structure in 
numerous relevant studies. The firm size and the level of tangible asset are known to be a proxy 
for the potential repayment capacity and collateral, being positively correlated with debt. 
Likewise, the risk factor is usually recognized as negative factor for debt since the risk is mainly 
shouldered on the creditor under the debt contract.  We adopt the indicators of these factors as 
following, 
Size: log of total asset 

Tangible Asset: Fixed Asset / T.A. 

7  However, bank borrowing ratio tends to increase in the early 2000s, though the level is still small. 
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Risk: standard deviation of ROA in 2000-04 
Another well known factor is the non-debt tax shield.  Even in the Modigliani-Miller’s 
framework, tax saving mechanism through the debt is a primary influence on the debt ratio 
(Modigliani-Miller (1963)).  Debt incurs tax saving because interest expenses are treated as 
deductions from taxable income.  However, the magnitude of this effect usually depends on 
the scope of tax deduction through debt, roughly determined by the residual of the total tax 
shield minus the non-debt tax shield.  Thus, the tax-saving effect through debt is negatively 
correlated with the non-debt tax shield.  We directly calculate the non-debt tax shield by 
following the method shown in Titman and Wessels (1988). 
NDTS:  Non-Debt Tax Shield = OI – I – T / 
8 
where    is the tax rate, OI is operating income, I is interest expenses, and T 
corporate tax 
The agency theory gives us possible control variables.  Financial Hierarchy argument 
(Fazzari et.al. 1988) and Pecking Order Hypothesis (Myers et.al. 1984) inform us that cash 
flow usually loosens the necessity of external finance since the self-finance is the cheapest 
fundraising source in term of capital cost. In fact, previous studies obtained negative 
correlations between cash flow and debt ratio.  On the other hand, the bank monitoring 
processes information which decreases the information asymmetry between creditors and 
firms.  If it is the case, the more active in bank borrowing, the more active debt financing. 
We introduce these factors in the following calculation. 
Cash Flow: retained earnings / T.A. 
Bank Borrowing: bank borrowing / debt 
Our major concern is placed on the relationship with listed status and foreign ownership. 
List Dummy tests the difference between listed and non-listed firms. For the foreign ownership, 
we prepare Foreign Share, the percentage of foreign share, and dummy variables for the four 
8  The formula is deduced from the simple relation; is T =   (OI – I - NDT), and NDT is the non-debt tax 
shield. 
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and six classes of foreign share: [0%, 0-10%, 10-50%, 50-95%, 95% and more], [0%, 0-10%, 
10-33.3%, 33.3-50%, 50-95%, 95% and more], 
Manufacturing Dummy and Time Trend are also introduced as explanatory variables in 
some cases in order to observe basic tendencies. 
We focus on three types of debt as dependent variables. 
1.  Debt Ratio = Debt / Total Assets; 
2.  Bank Borrowing Ratio = Bank Borrowing / Total Assets; 
3.  Non-Bank Debt = (Debt – Bank Borrowing) / Total Assets; 
6. The Result and interpretation 
6.1. Thailand 
(1) Overall Results 
The sample for the estimation is 1451 unbalanced panel data (449 listed, 952 unlisted 
firms), covering 2000-2004.  The estimation results in Table 5-1 show that the coefficients of 
firm size, tangible asset, tax saving effect through debt, indicate consistent sings, and significant 
in most cases.  Only the coefficients of risk are inconsistent and insignificant. 
The coefficients of cash flow for all the cases, and those of bank borrowing for the case of 
debt ratio as dependent variable show significant in negative sign.  These results suggest the 
existence of agency cost associated with external finance, and the role of financial intermediary 
for information processing. Roughly, the estimation results of control variables seem reasonable, 
which ensures that the agency cost approach makes sense as methodology, and allows us further 
interpretation on our concerning points in this framework.
    Manufacturing  dummy  is  not  significant  on  any dependent variable.  Time trend clearly is 
significant with negative sign on debt ratio and bank borrowings, which means the debt 
financing has been shrunk during early 2000s. 
(2) Listed Status 
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The coefficients of the list dummy in the estimations on debt ratio and bank borrowing ratio 
shows positive sign in the estimations on bank borrowing and negative, on debt and non-bank 
debt.  However, all the coefficients are not significant. The estimation results do not confirm 
our observation in Section 4
9. 
(3) Foreign Ownership and Capital Structure 
Before examine the estimation results, we will overview the descriptive statistics for the 
foreign ownership issue. Table 6 compares the average value of major indices such as debt and 
bank borrowing ratio classified by listed status and foreign share classes.  This shows us 
certain tendencies.  With the unlisted firms, debt ratio is almost similar across the classes of 
ownership structure, though slightly high at 33.3-95%. On the other hand, while in both local 
firms and foreign subsidiaries the bank borrowing ratio is around 19%, the ratio of joint 
ventures of ‘up to 33.3% foreign share’ is 14-15%, substantially lower
10.  Non-bank  debt  ratio 
shows an adverse tendency that the ratio is remarkably high in ‘up to 33.3% foreign share’ firms, 
while the ratio is almost constant in the other classes. To sum, bank borrowing and non-bank 
debt seems oppositely shaped along foreign shares, reaching the bottom and the roof 
respectively at the point of joint venture ownership, up to 33.3%. 
In the listed firms, most samples are distributed within a range of 0-10% foreign 
ownership. In this range, there seems to be a negative relationship between bank borrowing 
ratio and foreign ownership, and a positive relationship between non-bank debt ratio and foreign 
ownership, which is consistent to the tendency of unlisted firms.  Debt ratio itself is indifferent 
to foreign ownership, probably because the two components cancel out each other. 
Now, estimation results also confirm these tendency. In Table 5-1, in the cases of bank 
borrowing ratio and non-bank debt ratio, the coefficients of foreign share are significant in 
9  The results is inconsistent with Mieno(2006), which examined the nature in early 1990’s and found 

listed firms are significantly high in bank borrowings. 










   











negative and positive signs respectively, and the coefficients of its squared values are significant 
in the adverse signs, implying that the slope of bank borrowing ratio is U-shaped, while that of 
non-bank debt is inverse U-shaped along foreign share. 
However, the detailed observation by class dummies dose teach us that the picture is not 
so straightforward, i.e. consistent but unclear.  Table 5-2 shows the results of the estimation 
with class dummies, instead of foreign share itself.  Most coefficients of control variables are 
unchanged. Here we adopt two different types of class dummy: the same classification of 
Section 3.2, and more detailed classification.  The benchmark (the omitted dummy variables) 
is local firms, i.e. firms with zero percent foreign shares.  In these estimation, we could not 
find any significant result in bank borrowings, though coefficient itself forms U-Shape, 
suggesting that the U-shape correlation is relatively weak even if though exists.  Meanwhile, 
only the evidence consistent to inverse U-shape in non-bank debt is positive sign type B-a joint 
venture. 
On the other hand, on debt ratio estimation, the coefficient of foreign subsidiary is 
significant in positive sign, and on bank borrowing estimation, nearly significant in the same 
sign.  Foreign subsidiaries seem relatively high in debt and bank borrowing ratio compared 
with joint ventures, and even with local firms, which may be a main factor to forms the U-shape 
in bank borrowing ratio. 
6.2. Malaysia 
(1) Overall Results 
The sample of estimation is 3346 unbalanced panel data (2593 listed, 753 unlisted firms), 
covering 2000-04.  The estimation results in Table 7-1 show that the signs of coefficients of 
most control variables, namely size, tangible asset, NDTS are consistent and significant in most 
cases, and that of risk factor is insignificant. The coefficient of cash flow and bank borrowing is 












   




and show that agency approach seems to capture the nature of corporate finance also in the case 
of Malaysia. 
Different from Thai’s case, the manufacturing sector borrow from bank more, and is less 
dependent on non-bank debt.  Debt ratio as total sum of the two components is rather lower in 
the sector. Time trend also shows the opposite tendency to Thailand, firms have increased bank 
borrowing, and decreased non-bank debt during the early 2000s. The pace of change, however, 
seems very slow. 
(2) Listed Status 
As to the listed status, the clearer results are obtained from estimation. The bank 
borrowings are significantly high in listed firms, and the non bank debt seems lower in listed 
firms, although the coefficient does not clear the 10% significance criteria in the latter case. 
Contrasted to the case of Thailand, the estimation results clearly support the difference shown in 
descriptive statistics in Section 4. 
(3) Foreign Ownership and Capital Structure 
Table 8 compares the average value of debt ratio, bank borrowing ratio, classified by listed 
status and grouping of the classes in foreign ownership.  In Malaysia, the negative relationship 
between foreign shares and debt ratio is more clearly observed, which is common in the listed 
and unlisted firms. 
The estimation results suggest that the relationship between foreign share and capital 
structure is significant but non-linier in Malaysia.  Table 7-1 tells us that debt ratio is 
U-Shaped along foreign share.  The bank borrowing ratio is negatively correlated to foreign 
share, but unclear about whether the relationship is linier or non-liner. On the other hand, 










   
   
Table 7-2, which tests with class dummies for foreign share, give us richer information. 
On the estimations for bank borrowing ratio, the firms accepting foreign share 0-10% (Type A, 
Financial Investment), the debt ratio is significantly lower.  And ignoring this case, the bank 
borrowing ratio forms clear U-shape along the foreign share (10-100%). The estimation 
confirms the U-shaped form in debt ratio and non-bank debt; the ratios are lowest at joint 
venture case (Type B-b), and subsidiaries are lower than local firm or financial investment firms, 
but higher than joint ventures. 
6.3. Interpretation 
(1) Listed Status 
Different from the descriptive statistics in Section 4, the relationship between external 
finance and listed status remains unclear, and uncommon in two countries. In Malaysia, bank 
borrowing ratio is significantly high, and non bank borrowing ratio is seemingly low.  In 
Thailand, however, listed status is not significant in any dependent variables, though the signs 
of coefficient (positive in bank borrowing, negative in non bank debt), seemingly same in 
Malaysia. 
(2) Foreign Ownership 
Although the estimation results in Thailand and Malaysia include different natures 
associated with foreign ownership in detailed facts, we can find certain common characteristics. 
Minor difference lies rather in the pole cases.  In Thailand, foreign subsidiaries show high 
dependence on external finance, even higher than local firms. In Malaysia, the firms accepting 
financial investment from foreigners (within 10%) are especially less dependent on bank 
borrowing.  Ignoring such exceptions, the results show us that bank borrowing ratio is 
U-shaped in both countries; a certain type of joint-venture firms are the lowest on the 
dependence on external finance. 
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On the other hand, there is major difference between two countries in the nature of 
non-bank debt.  Whereas it shows inverse U-shape along foreign share, opposite to the shape 
of bank borrowing in Thailand, in Malaysia it is U-shaped, a nature same as the bank borrowing. 
This seems to suggest that the alternative fund sources for substitution of bank loan are different 
in two countries. Namely, the firms less dependent on bank borrowing tend to utilize the 
internal capital market in Thailand, and tend to depend on self-financing in Malaysia. 
One of the main research questions in the paper is whether or not the large presence of 
foreign firms under the FDI-led industrialization in East Asia influences the local financial 
system.  In Sections 3 and 4, we observed that foreign ownership is distributed mainly in the 
unlisted firm groups and that firms are generally less dependent on external finance, or financial 
intermediation, than developed countries.  Our estimations show that certain forms of joint 
ventures in Thailand and Malaysia are less dependent on financial intermediation than local 
firms or foreign subsidiaries. While, the relationship between debt, bank borrowing and foreign 
ownership is neither linear nor large enough, suggesting that foreign ownership does not seem 
to be a solo factor to bring about weak financial intermediation in Thailand. 
7. Discussions and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examined corporate finance in Thailand and Malaysia based on the 
originally compiled rich company database covering unlisted firms, which enabled us to 
examine the issue in light of listed status and foreign ownership. 
We found that financial intermediation is pretty inactive as a method for firms’ fundraising, 
as far as debt ratio or bank borrowing ratio shows, particularly in Malaysia.  In fact, these 
ratios are much lower than in developed countries, where the securities market is better 
developed.  This fact sharply contradicts the conventional view that excess debt financing is 
one of the core problems in East Asia and is a major cause of financial distress in 1997-8. 
We also found that a large portion of the major firms still remain unlisted, i.e. they choose 
not to participate in organized capital markets.  This is a common practice in Thailand. 
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The arguments to restructure the East Asian financial system have been emphasizing the 
prompt shift from a bank-oriented financial system to a market-based one.  Taking such basic 
facts of our finding into account, these policy stances are probably misleading, and are insulated 
from the real circumstances.  Thailand and Malaysia, and probably most East Asian countries, 
currently stand on a much earlier phase of financial development, where the core policy issues 
should be how inactive financial intermediation can be overcome, and how the firms can be 
encouraged to participate in organized capital markets. 
It is noteworthy that this situation has not been brought about by the recent financial crisis 
or financial liberalization policy of the proceeding period, but is rooted in the features of 
FDI-led industrialization, or the real sector growth in East Asia. 
We examined the relationship between foreign ownership and financing, searching for the 
significance of the FDI-led industrialization on the financial system.  As a result of this 
observation and estimation, we found a general rule: in firms whose foreign shares are higher, 
bank borrowing ratio is lower and non-bank debt is higher.  However, the relationship is not 
necessarily linear; i.e. in Thailand, the bank borrowing ratio of foreign subsidiaries is higher 
than that of joint ventures (U-shape), and in Malaysia firms accepting financial investment from 
foreigners is especially low in bank borrowing. Also, the firms with a higher foreign share tend 
to depend on internal markets (Thailand) and self-financing (Malaysia). 
As for foreign subsidiaries, the most important component of non-bank debt source may be 
a credit channel between parent companies and subsidiaries.  However, the information on 
parent–subsidiary lending was not available in our database, and not easily available in any 
database. The analysis on this point remains as a future issue. 
We attempted to raise a new discussion on the financial system in East Asia, and the work 
is still in a primitive stage. There remains much incompleteness in hypothesis setting, estimation 
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Local (FS.0%) Listed 




























Listed  Unlisted 
Rank by Size  1-400  401-800  801-1100  1-400  401-800  801-1100 
No. of  Firms  135  76  46  265  324  254 
Total of 10% or more 
 Foreign Share 95%-
 Foreign Share 50-95% 
 Foreign Share 10-50% 
Foreign Share -10% 












































   





































































































































Local (FS.0%) Listed 







Listed  Unlisted 
Rank by Size 
o. of  Firms 
1-600  601-1200  1201-1800  1-600  601-1200  1201-1800 
N 445  279  124  155  321  476 
T 0.4%  1.4%  0.8%  14.2%  12.8%  11.8%
 Foreign Share 95%-
otal of 10% or more 
0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  9.7%  7.8%  6.1%
 Foreign Share 50-95%  0.2%  0.7%  0.8%  3.9%  2.5%  3.4%
 Foreign Share 10-50% 
oreign Share -10% 
oreign Share 0% 
0.2%  0.7%  0.0%  0.6%  2.5%  2.3% 
F 0.2%  0.0%  0.8%  1.3%  0.6%  0.2% 
F 99.3%  98.6%  98.4%  83.9%  85.7%  86.3% 
Note: The percentages present the shares in number in the listed and the unlisted firms respectively 
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Table 1 Sample Design and Distribution 
(1) Thailand 
Rank by Asset  Listed Firms  Non-listed Firms  Asset Size 
1st  501,721 
447th  2,586 ↑'Financial Statement Sample' 
1189th  1,040 
268  921 




Total 1,301  380  921 
Note: Total Asset in 2004, Million Baths 
Parentheses represent the % of no. of listed firms in each class. 
(2) Malaysia 








Rank by Asset  Listed Firms  Non-listed Firms  Asset Size 
1st  12,521,700 
846th  117,011 ↑'Financial Statement Sample' 
1824th  30,531 
887  978 




Total 1,860  923  937 
Note: Total Asset in 2004, Thousand Ringgt 
Parentheses represent the % of no. of listed firms in each class. 









   
 
 
Table 2 The largest Shareholders' Nationality 
Thailand  Malaysia 
Number  % to total 
Thailand  696  63.7% 
Japan  206  18.8% 
the U.S.  78  7.1% 
Singapore  63  5.8% 
Hong Kong  20  1.8% 
Malaysia  12  1.1% 
Korea  10  0.9% 
Taiwan  5  0.5% 
Others  3  0.3% 
Total  1093 
Number  % to total 
Malaysia  1430  77.4% 
Japan  119  6.4% 
Singapore  92  5.0% 
EU  85  4.6% 
the U.S.  51  2.8% 
Taiwan  13  0.7% 
Virgin Island  11  0.6% 
Hong Kong  9  0.5% 
Australia  6  0.3% 
Cayman Islands  5  0.3% 
Korea  5  0.3% 
Others  22  1.2% 
Total  1848 





Table 3 Capital Structure of the sample firms, Thailand 
(1) Non-listed 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average 
No. of Sample  201  197  204  208  207 
1 Liabilities  57.5%  55.3%  54.7%  54.4%  51.7%  54.7% 
2 Current Liabilities  39.0%  37.1%  37.3%  37.8%  37.4%  37.7% 
3  Account payable  10.3%  10.7%  11.0%  12.8%  12.7%  11.5% 
4  Short term borrowings  11.9%  11.3%  11.8%  10.6%  9.8%  11.1% 
5  Other Current Liabilities  13.3%  11.2%  12.6%  13.1%  13.0%  12.6% 
6 Non Current Liabilities  18.4%  18.2%  17.4%  16.6%  14.3%  17.0% 
7  Long term Borrowings  5.6%  7.5%  7.5%  6.9%  6.6%  6.8% 
8  Other Non Current Liabilities  4.3%  4.3%  3.3%  3.4%  2.3%  3.5% 
9 Capital Accounts  42.5%  44.5%  45.3%  45.6%  48.3%  45.3% 
10  Paid in Capital  32.3%  30.1%  30.9%  28.5%  26.3%  29.6% 
11  Retained Earnings  3.7%  7.4%  8.4%  11.0%  16.3%  9.4% 
12  Capital Surplus  6.5%  7.1%  6.0%  6.1%  5.7%  6.3% 
13 
14 
Total bank borrowings (4)+(7) 
Non-bank debt (1)-(13) 
17.5%  18.8%  19.3%  17.5%  16.4% 




2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average 
No. of Sample  84  101  116  131  136 
1 Liabilities  60.6%  59.0%  56.3%  53.1%  53.4%  56.5% 
2 Current Liabilities  32.5%  30.0%  32.3%  28.2%  30.2%  30.7% 
3  Account payable  7.2%  6.9%  8.6%  6.9%  7.2%  7.4% 
4  Short term borrowings  5.8%  4.4%  4.4%  3.4%  4.1%  4.4% 
5  Other Current Liabilities  19.5%  18.7%  19.3%  17.9%  18.9%  18.9% 
6 Non Current Liabilities  28.1%  29.0%  23.9%  24.9%  23.1%  25.8% 
7  Long term Borrowings  19.9%  20.7%  16.9%  17.7%  16.0%  18.2% 
8  Debentures  3.8%  2.7%  2.0%  2.2%  2.7%  2.7% 
9  Other Non Current Liabilities  4.4%  5.6%  5.0%  5.1%  4.5%  4.9% 
10 Capital Accounts  39.4%  41.0%  43.7%  46.9%  46.6%  43.5% 
11  Paid in Capital  23.4%  25.9%  24.0%  68.3%  26.1%  33.5% 
12  Retained Earnings  -8.7%  -4.2%  4.6%  6.3%  9.9%  1.6% 
13  Capital Surplus  24.6%  19.4%  15.1%  -27.8%  10.6%  8.4% 
14 
15 
Total bank borrowings (4)+(7) 
Non-bank debt (1)-(13) 
25.7%  25.1%  21.3%  21.1%  20.0% 










Table 4 Capital Structure of the sample firms, Malaysia 
(1) Non-listed 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average 
No. of Sample  182  204  206  208  212 
1 Liabilities  37.9%  39.4%  40.1%  39.0%  39.0%  39.1% 
2 Current Liabilities  32.0%  31.8%  32.7%  32.3%  32.2%  32.2% 
3  Account payable  19.2%  19.0%  22.6%  19.8%  20.8%  20.3% 
4  Short term borrowings  2.8%  3.2%  2.5%  3.2%  3.3%  3.0%
 Borrowings from Related Parties  3.2%  2.8%  2.7%  2.5%  2.1%  2.7% 
5  Other Current Liabilities  6.8%  6.9%  4.9%  6.8%  5.9%  6.2% 
6 Non Current Liabilities  6.0%  7.5%  7.4%  6.7%  6.8%  6.9% 
7  Long term Borrowings  1.8%  3.1%  2.0%  2.1%  2.4%  2.3% 
8  Other Non Current Liabilities  4.2%  4.4%  5.4%  4.6%  4.4%  4.6% 
9 Capital Accounts  62.1%  60.6%  59.9%  61.0%  61.0%  60.9% 
10  Paid in Capital  33.1%  30.5%  26.9%  30.8%  29.1%  30.1% 
11  Retained Earnings  17.0%  17.1%  20.2%  14.3%  20.5%  17.8% 
12  Capital Surplus  12.0%  13.1%  12.7%  16.0%  11.5%  13.0% 
13 
14 
Total bank borrowings (4)+(7) 
Non-bank debt (1)-(13) 
4.6%  6.3%  4.6%  5.4%  5.7% 
33.3%  33.1%  35.5%  33.6%  33.3% 
5.3% 
33.8% 
Note: 'Borrowing from Related Parties' are available only for current liabilities. 
(2) Listed 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average 
No. of Sample  479  498  552  609  628 
1 Liabilities  45.7%  43.3%  44.0%  45.8%  46.5%  45.0% 
2 Current Liabilities  31.9%  29.2%  28.4%  28.6%  28.7%  29.4% 
3  Account payable  7.9%  7.1%  7.2%  7.7%  7.7%  7.5% 
4  Short term borrowings  2.2%  2.0%  2.3%  2.6%  2.4%  2.3% 
5  Other Current Liabilities  21.8%  20.1%  18.9%  18.4%  18.7%  19.6% 
6 Non Current Liabilities  13.8%  14.1%  15.5%  17.1%  17.7%  15.7% 
7  Long term Borrowings  7.7%  8.0%  9.3%  9.6%  10.4%  9.0% 
8  Debentures  0.7%  0.9%  0.9%  1.0%  1.1%  0.9% 
9  Other Non Current Liabilities  5.3%  5.2%  5.3%  6.5%  6.3%  5.7% 
10 Capital Accounts  54.3%  56.7%  56.0%  54.2%  53.5%  55.0% 
11  Paid in Capital  30.6%  32.3%  33.9%  34.2%  34.9%  33.2% 
12  Retained Earnings  5.2%  6.4%  5.2%  7.6%  6.7%  6.2% 
13  Capital Surplus  18.6%  18.0%  16.9%  12.5%  11.9%  15.6% 
14 
15 
Total bank borrowings (4)+(7) 
Non-bank debt (1)-(13) 
9.9%  10.0%  11.6%  12.2%  12.7% 






   
   
           
             
         
 
Table 5-1  Estimation Result for Thailand 







0.0761  ***  0.0760  *** 
10.34  10.32 
-0.0181  -0.0182 
-0.66  -0.66 
1.94E-06  1.94E-06 
1.05  1.05 
-0.1356  ***  -0.1357  *** 
-4.73  -4.73 
-0.3157  ***  -0.3158  *** 
-16.54  -16.54 
0.1099  ***  0.1101  *** 
7.50  7.51 
0.0443  ***  0.0449  *** 
5.65  5.73 
0.1102  ***  0.1107  *** 
3.68  3.70 
-1.14E-06  -1.16E-06 
-0.49  -0.49 
-0.0078  -0.0075 
-0.22  -0.21 
-0.1557  ***  -0.1547  *** 
-7.22  -7.18 
0.0267  ***  0.0259  *** 
3.16  3.07 
-0.1142  ***  -0.1151  *** 
-3.56  -3.60 
2.54E-06  2.55E-06 
1.11  1.12 
-0.1300  ***  -0.1306  *** 
-3.70  -3.71 
-0.1715  ***  -0.1725  *** 
-7.6  -7.65 
List Dummy  -0.0196  -0.0203  0.0027  0.0053  -0.0177  -0.0206 
-0.74  -0.77  0.12  0.23  -0.64  -0.75 
Foreign Share  0.0006  0.0011  0.0002  -0.0018  *  0.0004  0.0027  ** 
1.55  0.82  0.56  -1.61  0.95  1.96 
(Foreign Share) ^ 2  -5.90E-06  2.19E-05 *  -2.54E-05 * 
-0.42  1.83  -1.77 
Manuf. Dummy  0.0119  0.0112  0.0076  0.0102  0.0021  -0.0009 
0.48  0.45  0.35  0.47  0.08  -0.03 
Trend  -0.0102  **  -0.0102  **  -0.0051  **  -0.0053  **  -0.0039  -0.0038 
-4.97  -4.96  -2.02  -2.07  -1.55  -1.49 
Constant  -0.6079  ***  -0.6078  *** 
-5.38  -5.37 
-0.5256  ***  -0.5290  *** 
-4.39  -4.42 
0.0225  0.0290 
0.17  0.22 
R-square  0.2014  0.2026  0.1063  0.1065  0.0848  0.0855 
Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values. 
Size: log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk: Standard Deviation of ROA during 
2000-2004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is of 
listed firm, Trend : Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 if the sample is 






       
       
         
 
Table 5-2  Estimation Result for Thailand 







0.0764  ***  0.0762  *** 
10.36  10.34 
-0.0161  -0.0167 
-0.58  -0.60 
0.0000  0.0000 
1.06  1.06 
-0.1345  ***  -0.1347  *** 
-4.69  -4.70 
-0.3163  ***  -0.3161  *** 
-16.54  -16.55 
0.1099  ***  0.1099  *** 
7.50  7.50 
0.0451  ***  0.0451  *** 
5.75  5.76 
0.1116  ***  0.1124  *** 
3.71  3.75 
0.0000  0.0000 
-0.50  -0.50 
-0.0071  -0.0070 
-0.20  -0.20 
-0.1539  ***  -0.1543  *** 
-7.13  -7.16 
0.0262  ***  0.0260  *** 
3.09  3.07 
-0.1131  ***  -0.1143  *** 
-3.52  -3.56 
0.0000  0.0000 
1.13  1.13 
-0.1293  ***  -0.1296  *** 
-3.67  -3.68 
-0.1735  ***  -0.1730  *** 
-7.68  -7.67 
List Dummy  -0.0287  -0.0317 
-0.95  -1.10 
0.0105  0.0102 
0.40  0.40 
-0.0335  -0.0359 
-1.07  -1.19 
0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%  0.0187  -0.0156  0.0319 
0.57  -0.54  0.93 
10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 33.3%  0.0401  -0.0343  0.0690 
0.72  -0.71  1.19 
33.3 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%  0.0672  -0.0333  0.0930  ** 
1.54  -0.89  2.06 
50 < _[Foreign Share] < 66.6%  0.0239  -0.0528  0.0679 
0.40  -1.03  1.10 
66.6 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95%  -0.0009  -0.0272  0.0212 
-0.02  -0.61  0.40 
95% <_ [Foreign Share]  0.0731  *  0.0489  0.0247 
1.86  1.44  0.61 
0 < [Foreign Share] < 10% 







10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50% 





0.0843  ** 
2.25 
50 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95% 







95 < _[Foreign Share] 
Type C: Foreign Subsidiaries 






Manuf. Dummy  0.0141  0.0147  0.0107  0.0111  0.0014  0.0016 
0.56  0.59  0.49  0.51  0.05  0.06 
Trend  -0.0102  ***  -0.0102  ***  -0.0053  **  -0.0053  **  -0.0038  -0.0037 
-4.97  -4.96  -2.09  -2.08  -1.49  -1.49 
Constant  -0.6192  ***  -0.6149  *** 
-5.46  -5.43 
-0.5325  ***  -0.5330  *** 
-4.44  -4.46 
0.0188  0.0235 
0.14  0.18 
R-square  0.2055  0.2061  0.1141  0.1089  0.0884  0.0892 
Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values. 
Size: log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk: Standard Deviation of ROA during 
2000-2004, NDTS: calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is of 
listed firm, Trend : Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 if the sample 





     
 
 





     
 
 






     
 
 






     
 
 






     
 
 
   
 
 
Table 6 Foreign Shares and Debt, Thailand 
(1) Debt Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  58.3%  57.5%  56.3%  57.1%  51.8%  56.2%  93-100 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  62.7%  55.5%  55.5%  53.2%  57.5%  56.9%  16-18 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  55.2%  52.5%  51.2%  49.8%  49.5%  51.6%  50 
95% < Foreign Share  56.0%  53.4%  54.7%  54.0%  51.5%  53.9%  37-40 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  63.6%  59.6%  57.2%  51.0%  51.8%  56.6%  24-48 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  60.0%  60.2%  55.7%  55.2%  54.3%  57.1%  42-65 
10% < Foreign Share  58.4%  54.9%  56.3%  51.7%  54.2%  55.1%  18-23 
(2) Bank Borrowing Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  18.2%  19.3%  21.6%  19.8%  17.7%  19.3%  93-100 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  13.2%  11.7%  13.0%  14.0%  19.3%  14.3%  16-18 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  14.5%  18.6%  17.3%  12.9%  12.7%  15.2%  50 
95% < Foreign Share  21.7%  21.3%  18.8%  18.8%  16.6%  19.4%  37-40 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  30.2%  27.8%  22.0%  22.8%  22.7%  25.1%  24-48 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  26.4%  26.4%  23.1%  22.7%  20.5%  23.8%  42-65 
10% < Foreign Share  18.1%  17.3%  15.4%  13.5%  13.2%  15.5%  18-23 
(3) Non-bank Debt Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  40.2%  38.2%  34.7%  37.2%  34.1%  36.9%  93-100 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  49.5%  43.8%  42.4%  39.2%  38.1%  42.6%  16-18 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  40.7%  33.9%  33.9%  36.9%  36.8%  36.4%  50 
95% < Foreign Share  34.4%  32.1%  35.9%  35.2%  34.9%  34.5%  37-40 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  33.4%  31.9%  35.2%  28.2%  29.1%  31.6%  24-48 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  33.6%  33.8%  32.6%  32.5%  33.8%  33.3%  42-65 
10% < Foreign Share  40.3%  37.6%  40.9%  38.2%  41.0%  39.6%  18-23 
(4) Current Liability / T.A. 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  38.3%  36.6%  35.8%  37.7%  35.3%  36.7%  93-100 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  36.4%  30.3%  30.3%  28.3%  33.5%  31.8%  16-18 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  37.2%  37.8%  37.9%  37.2%  39.2%  37.9%  50 
95% < Foreign Share  44.2%  40.4%  43.2%  43.0%  42.0%  42.6%  37-40 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  32.0%  25.0%  31.5%  25.2%  28.4%  28.4%  24-48 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  30.7%  30.6%  30.2%  27.6%  28.6%  29.5%  42-65 
10% < Foreign Share  37.4%  37.0%  39.6%  36.0%  38.8%  37.7%  18-23 
(5) Retained Earnings / T.A. 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  - 3 . 1 %  1 . 1 %  2 . 4 %  1 . 7 %  8 . 8 %  2.2%  93-100 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  -4.8%  -6.5%  -12.3%  1.8%  7.5%  -2.9%  16-18 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  12.1%  14.7%  18.4%  25.0%  27.0%  19.4%  50 
95% < Foreign Share  13.5%  19.5%  19.7%  21.1%  25.5%  19.9%  37-40 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  -12.6%  -9.2%  0.5%  0.7%  4.6%  -3.2%  24-48 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  -7.6%  -2.8%  6.3%  8.4%  12.5%  3.4%  42-65 




     
 
           
             
           
   
 
Table 7-1  Estimation Result for Malaysia 







0.0332  ***  0.0334  *** 
9.56  9.60 
0.0728  ***  0.0730  *** 
12.54  12.59 
-0.0192  ***  -0.0192  *** 
- 6 . 6 3  - 6 . 6 4 
-8.9E-06  -8.8E-06 
-1.16  -1.15 
0.0000  -0.0002 
-0.01  -0.07 
0.2656  ***  0.2659  *** 
17.08  17.11 
0.0025  0.0025 
1.09  1.11 
0.0248  ***  0.0249  *** 
6.66  6.66 
-0.0086  ***  -0.0086  *** 
- 4 . 5 9  - 4 . 5 9 
4.5E-07  4.6E-07 
0.09  0.09 
-0.0052  ***  -0.0052  *** 
-2.95  -2.96 
0.0307  ***  0.0308  *** 
9.84  9.87 
0.0546  ***  0.0548  *** 
10.10  10.13 
-0.0134  ***  -0.0134  *** 
- 5 . 0 3  - 5 . 0 3 
-9.6E-06  -9.6E-06 
-1.33  -1.32 
0.0024  0.0022 
0.91  0.86 
List Dummy  -0.0108  -0.0096  0.1604  ***  0.1606  ***  -0.0996  -0.0984 
-0.14  -0.13  3.07  3.07  -1.56  -1.54 
Trend  -1.5E-11  -1.2E-11  1.3E-10 ***  1.3E-10 ***  -9.6E-11 **  -9.3E-11 * 
-0.29  -0.22  3.76  3.77  -1.96  -1.90 
Foreign Share 
(Foreign Share) ^ 2 
-0.0005  ***  -0.0011  *** 
- 4 . 6 3  - 3 . 5 5 
5.8E-06 *** 
2.10 
-0.0003  ***  -0.0004  ** 
- 4 . 8 2  - 2 . 0 2 
7.5E-07 
0.42 
-0.0003  **  -0.0008  *** 
- 3 . 2 6  - 2 . 7 7 
4.6E-06 * 
1.76 
Manuf. Dummy  -0.0172  -0.0172 
-1.99  **  -1.99  ** 
0.0253  0.0253 
4.47  ***  4.46  *** 
-0.0277  -0.0276 
-3.59  ***  -3.59  *** 
Constant  -0.0754  -0.0774 
- 0 . 8 4  - 0 . 8 7 
-0.0735  -0.0739 
- 1 . 2 1  - 1 . 2 2 
-0.0073  -0.0089 
- 0 . 1 0  - 0 . 1 2 
R-square  0.2014  0.2026  0.1063  0.1065  0.0848  0.0855 
Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values. 
Size : log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk : Standard Deviation of ROA 
during 2000-2004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the 
sample is of listed firm, Trend: Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 
if the sample is of anufacturing Sector 
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Table 7-2  Estimation Result for Malaysia 







0.0340  ***  0.0338  *** 
9.75  9.76 
0.0729  ***  0.0728  *** 
12.63  12.58 
-9.7E-06  -9.7E-06 
-1.28  -1.27 
-0.0005  -0.0009 
-0.19  -0.33 
-0.0189  ***  -0.0190  *** 
- 6 . 5 6  - 6 . 5 8 
0.2617  ***  0.2641  *** 
16.84  16.97 
0.0021  0.0026 
0.91  1.13 
0.0257  ***  0.0257  *** 
6.91  6.88 
4.4E-07  5.5E-07 
0.09  0.11 
-0.0048  ***  -0.0049  *** 
-2.69  -2.74 
-0.0083  ***  -0.0085  *** 
- 4 . 4 4  - 4 . 5 1 
0.0316  ***  0.0312  *** 
10.10  10.01 
0.0543  ***  0.0543  *** 
10.09  10.08 
-1.0E-05  -1.0E-05 
-1.45  -1.45 
0.0017  0.0014 
0.66  0.54 
-0.0132  ***  -0.0132  *** 
- 4 . 9 7  - 4 . 9 7 
List Dummy  -0.0165  -0.0054 
-0.22  -0.07 
0.1615  ***  0.1621  *** 
3.09  3.10 
-0.1059  *  -0.0956 
-1.65  -1.49 
0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%  0.0098 
0.39 










33.3 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%  -0.1495  *** 
-4.71 
-0.0359  * 
-1.72 
-0.0982  *** 
-3.43 
50 < _[Foreign Share] < 66.6%  -0.1185  *** 
-5.51 
-0.0559  *** 
-3.97 
-0.0859  *** 
-4.41 




-0.1027  *** 
-4.87 
95% <_ [Foreign Share]  -0.0359  *** 
-3.31 
-0.0338  *** 
-4.82 
-0.0181  * 
-1.78 
0 < [Foreign Share] < 10% 
Type A: Financial Investment 
0.0102 
0.40 




10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50% 







50 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95% 
Type B-b: Joint Venture 
-0.1110  *** 
-6.90 
-0.0336  *** 
-3.22 
-0.0935  *** 
-6.33 
95 < _[Foreign Share] 
Type C: Foreign Subsidiaries 
-0.0358  *** 
-3.29 
-0.0344  *** 
-4.90 
-0.0176  * 
-1.73 
Manuf. Dummy  -0.0197  **  -0.0194  ** 
-2.28  -2.24 
0.0255  ***  0.0259  *** 
4.50  4.56 
-0.0297  ***  -0.0296  *** 
-3.85  -3.84 
Trend  -2.4E-11  -6.9E-12 
-0.47  -0.13 
1.2E-10 ***  1.3E-10 *** 
3.71  3.82 
-1.0E-10 **  -9.0E-11 * 
-2.13  -1.85 
Constant  -0.0736  -0.0840 
- 0 . 8 2  - 0 . 9 4 
-0.0675  -0.0753 
- 1 . 1 1  - 1 . 2 4 
-0.0103  -0.0148 
- 0 . 1 3  - 0 . 1 9 
R-square  0.2055  0.2061  0.1141  0.1089  0.0884  0.0892 
Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values. 
Size : log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk : Standard Deviation of ROA during 2000-
2004, NDTS: calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is of listed firm, 




















Table 8 Foreign Shares and Debt, Malaysia 
(1) Debt Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  36.7%  41.1%  40.6%  40.9%  42.0%  40.3%  89-108 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  40.1%  43.3%  35.8%  36.1%  40.1%  39.1%  14-16 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  34.2%  32.2%  37.8%  38.7%  41.3%  36.8%  13-18 
95% < Foreign Share  40.1%  37.2%  37.5%  36.7%  37.0%  37.7%  62-74 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  46.7%  44.2%  44.9%  46.3%  46.9%  45.8%  413-551 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  37.4%  38.1%  40.7%  44.0%  45.1%  41.1%  21-24 
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%  44.3%  41.5%  38.5%  45.4%  47.6%  43.5%  26-33 
50% < Foreign Share  35.0%  31.3%  31.1%  33.1%  33.3%  32.8%  19-20 
(2) Bank Borrowing Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  5.0%  7.5%  5.8%  7.2%  5.9%  6.3%  89-108 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  4.9%  6.0%  6.1%  3.9%  3.2%  4.8%  14-16 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  3.5%  3.3%  6.1%  5.7%  5.5%  4.8%  13-18 
95% < Foreign Share  4.2%  5.1%  4.3%  3.8%  2.7%  4.0%  62-74 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  10.4%  10.5%  12.2%  12.6%  13.0%  11.7%  413-551 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  7.2%  9.0%  11.2%  9.8%  11.1%  9.6%  21-24 
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%  8.5%  8.0%  7.4%  13.0%  14.8%  10.3%  26-33 
50% < Foreign Share  4.0%  2.6%  2.8%  3.7%  3.4%  3.3%  19-20 
(3) Non-bank Debt Ratio 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  31.7%  33.5%  34.7%  33.7%  36.2%  34.0%  89-108 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  35.2%  37.3%  29.7%  32.2%  37.0%  34.3%  14-16 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  30.7%  28.9%  31.7%  33.0%  35.8%  32.0%  13-18 
95% < Foreign Share  35.9%  32.2%  33.2%  32.9%  34.2%  33.7%  62-74 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  36.3%  33.7%  32.7%  33.8%  33.9%  34.1%  413-551 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  30.2%  29.1%  29.5%  34.2%  34.0%  31.4%  21-24 
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%  35.8%  33.5%  31.1%  32.4%  32.8%  33.1%  26-33 
50% < Foreign Share  31.0%  28.7%  28.2%  29.4%  29.9%  29.4%  19-20 
(4) Current Liability / T.A. 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  30.9%  31.1%  32.3%  32.1%  31.9%  31.6%  89-108 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  32.7%  36.0%  30.5%  29.9%  33.1%  32.4%  14-16 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  32.0%  30.0%  34.8%  35.2%  35.2%  33.4%  13-18 
95% < Foreign Share  33.3%  32.3%  32.1%  32.0%  33.2%  32.6%  62-74 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  32.3%  29.5%  28.7%  28.9%  28.9%  29.7%  413-551 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  27.2%  25.0%  26.2%  26.1%  26.3%  26.1%  21-24 
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%  31.1%  29.0%  27.6%  27.6%  29.5%  29.0%  26-33 
50% < Foreign Share  28.8%  26.9%  24.9%  25.0%  26.9%  26.5%  19-20 
(5) Retained Earnings / T.A. 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average  No. of Sample 
Non-listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  19.3%  19.3%  14.3%  24.6%  20.7%  19.6%  89-108 
0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％  19.4%  3.2%  22.6%  21.4%  15.5%  16.4%  14-16 
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%  12.4%  22.3%  -6.5%  -2.7%  6.8%  6.5%  13-18 
95% < Foreign Share  14.3%  15.9%  17.6%  20.1%  23.6%  18.3%  62-74 
Listed 
Foreign Share = 10%  3.8%  5.7%  4.4%  7.9%  6.8%  5.7%  413-551 
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%  8.8%  7.4%  3.9%  -0.5%  -1.5%  3.6%  21-24 
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%  13.3%  12.0%  15.7%  4.4%  6.2%  10.3%  26-33 
50% < Foreign Share  19.7%  12.8%  13.5%  13.0%  16.3%  15.1%  19-20 
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